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KILLING TWO BIRDS WITH ONE STONE1THE PROPER (NON)APPLICATION OF JUDICIAL
ESTOPPEL: PARKER V. WENDY’S
INTERNATIONAL, INC., 365 F.3d 1268 (11th Cir.
2004)
Jonathan M. Hiltz∗
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Parker v. Wendy’s Int’l, Inc., the Eleventh Circuit exercised an
appropriate degree of restraint in its decision not to invoke the doctrine of
judicial estoppel.2 The court correctly decided that judicial estoppel, which
is “an equitable doctrine invoked at a court’s discretion,”3 was not
applicable. The court upheld not only the equitable principles upon which
judicial estoppel is founded, but also properly observed one of the primary
purposes behind bankruptcy. The court also precluded an allegedly
discriminating employer from eluding legal scrutiny for its nefarious
actions.
Judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine that seeks “to prevent the
perversion of the judicial process.”4 While not compromising this
objective, the court advanced important objectives such as the
accountability of employers and repayment of creditors in bankruptcy.
These objectives were advanced through the court’s well reasoned opinion
that not only shows the proper place for judicial estoppel, but also allows
for further doctrinal changes that will preclude the evils that judicial
estoppel seeks to prevent.
This Note will discuss the virtues that the Eleventh Circuit opinion
serves, and will provide a measured response to the likely
counterarguments. This Note will also make recommendations as to

∗

Staff Writer, 2004-2005, University of Dayton Law Review; Editor in Chief, 2005-2006, University of
Dayton Law Review. Juris Doctor expected May 2006, University of Dayton School of Law; B.S.,
Business Administration, 2003, Miami University. The author would like to thank his friends and
family for their continued support and encouragement. The author would also like to thank his
Executive Editor for Notes & Comments, Matt Branic, as well as Professors Morris and Hallinan for
their input and assistance given in the production of this case note.
1
1656 Hobbes, "Liberty,etc" (1841) 117 “t.h. thinks to kill two birds with one stone and satisfy two
arguments with one answer.” (available at www.phrases.org.uk/bulletin_board/24/messages/871.html).
2

Parker v. Wendy’s Intl. Inc., 365 F.3d 1268 (11th Cir. 2004).
Burnes v. Pemco Aeroplex, Inc., 291 F.3d 1282, 1285 (11th Cir. 2002).
4
Id.
3

Published by eCommons, 2004

402

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol.30:3

prudent steps that the courts could take to (1) advance the objectives that
the Parker court seeks to attain; and (2) to prevent unjust enrichment.
Section II will provide an overview of the procedural history of the case
and the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion. This section will also discuss the
substance of the judicial estoppel doctrine along with an explanation of
objectives that the doctrine seeks to achieve. Section III will discuss how
the Parker decision is supported by the text of the Bankruptcy Code. This
section will also explain how the court’s holding upholds the equitable
considerations that are at the foundation of the Bankruptcy Code and our
legal system in general. This section concludes with a suggested extension
of the doctrine of judicial estoppel. This extension is based on the
foundation laid down by the Eleventh Circuit in Parker. Section IV will
conclude that the Parker court appropriately clarified the doctrine of
judicial estoppel in a way consistent with the text of the Bankruptcy Code.
This section also concludes that the principles laid down in Parker would
allow for an extension of the doctrine that would further the equitable
considerations discussed in Section III.
II.

BACKGROUND

In analyzing the proper place for judicial estoppel in the bankruptcy
context, it is necessary to understand the doctrine of judicial estoppel, the
purpose it serves, and the evils it seeks to prevent. It is also necessary to
understand the equitable considerations inherent in bankruptcy and
employment discrimination law. This section will discuss the facts and
procedural history of the case, followed by a brief description of the case
that Parker is distinguished from. Finally, it will describe in detail the
holding of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals and the rationale behind
the decision.
A.

The Doctrine of Judicial Estoppel in the Bankruptcy Context

Judicial estoppel prevents a party from prevailing with a certain
legal argument at one legal phase, only to advocate a contradictory position
at a later legal phase.5 In the bankruptcy context, this doctrine prevents a
debtor from concealing potential causes of action when scheduling their
assets and potential assets, only to pursue that cause of action at a later
time.6 Judicial estoppel seeks to prevent litigants from “playing fast and
loose with the courts” by asserting inconsistent positions before the courts.7
This arises in the bankruptcy context when a litigant fails to schedule
causes of action that arose before they filed for bankruptcy. In failing to
schedule this potential asset, the debtor effectively asserts a position before

5

New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 749 (2001).
Data Gen. Corp. v. Johnson, 78 F.3d 1556, 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
7
In re Cassidy, 892 F.3d 637, 641 (7th Cir. 1990).
6
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the court that the particular cause of action does not exist.8 The Bankruptcy
Code requires that the debtor schedule all assets and liabilities.9 The
moment the debtor files its petition for relief and schedules all actual and
potential assets, the debtor is asserting a position before the court that the
scheduled assets and liabilities are the only ones that exist.10 The
Bankruptcy Code also requires that the debtor update his asset schedule
with any interest in property that the debtor acquires after the
commencement of the case.11
The bankruptcy courts will apply judicial estoppel when a debtor
omits potential causes of action against third parties from its schedule of
assets (Chapter 7)12 or its reorganization plan (Chapter 1113 or Chapter
1314), and then asserts those causes of action in subsequent litigation.15
Courts have held that any likely litigation outside the bankruptcy context
must be scheduled with the existing assets.16 “The rule of full disclosure of
assets is without qualification or exception, and is perhaps the single most
fundamental tenet of bankruptcy law.”17
Given that creditors and the bankruptcy courts rely heavily on the
debtor’s schedule of assets,18 the discouragement of nondisclosure is a vital
objective of the courts. A debtor’s attempt to “[c]onceal [his] claims, get
rid of [his] creditors on the cheap, and start over with a new bundle of rights
. . . is a palpable fraud that the court will not tolerate.”19 In the case that a
debtor in bankruptcy: (i) is aware of a potential claim against a party prior
to the filing of its bankruptcy petition; (ii) omits the potential claim from its
schedule of assets; (iii) asserts such a claim against that third party for the

8

Honorable William Houston Brown, Lundy Carpenter, & Donna T. Snow, Debtors' Counsel Beware:
Use of the Doctrine of Judicial Estoppel in Nonbankruptcy Forums, 75 Am. Bankr. L.J. 197, 228 (2001)
(citing e.g., Jinright v. Paulk, 758 So.2d 553 (Ala. 2000)).
9
11 U.S.C. § 521(1) (2000).
10
Westland Oil Dev. Corp. v. MCorp Mgt. Solutions, Inc., 157 B.R. 100, 102 (S.D. Tex. 1993).
11
11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(7) (2000). See also Tennyson v. Challenge Reality, 313 B.R. 402, 405 (Bankr.
W.D. Ky. 2004) (“The duty to disclose is a continuing one that does not end once the forms are
submitted to the bankruptcy court.”).
12
See Chapter 7 Liquidation, 11 U.S.C. § 701-784 (2000).
13
See Chapter 11 Reorganization, 11 U.S.C. § 1101-1174 (2000).
14
See Chapter 13 Adjustment of Debts of an Individual with Regular Income, 11 U.S.C. § 1301-1330
(2005).
15
See Payless Wholesale Distributors, Inc. v. Alberto Culver (P.R.) Inc., 989 F.2d 570 (1st Cir. 1993);
Oneida Motor Freight, Inc. v. United Jersey Bank, 848 F.2d 414 (3rd Cir. 1988).
16
Oneida Motor Freight, 848 F.2d at 417 (citing Monroe County Oil Co. v. Amoco Oil Co., 75 B.R. 158
(S.D. Ind. 1987)).
17
J. Gottlieb & B. Greer, The Doctrines of Standing and Judicial Estoppel: How Actions or Omissions
in Bankruptcy Proceedings May Preclude the Assertion of Claims by a Debtor in a Subsequent Action, 9
J. Bankr. L. & Prac. 487, 492 (2000).
18
Creditors and bankruptcy courts rely on the debtor’s disclosure statements and the accuracy thereof
when considering whether to approve a no-asset discharge. Burnes, 291 F.3d at 1282. See also Ryan
Operations G.P. v. Santiam-Midwest Lumber Co., 81 F.3d 355, 362 (3rd Cir. 1996) (noting that full and
honest disclosure in a bankruptcy case is “crucial to the effective functioning of the federal bankruptcy
system” and its importance “cannot be overstated”).
19
Payless Wholesale Distributors, Inc., 989 F.2d at 571.

Published by eCommons, 2004

404

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol.30:3

debtors benefit; and in certain jurisdictions (iv) has demonstrated a motive
to conceal such claims from its asset schedules, that debtor will be
judicially estopped from pursuing that cause of action against a third
party.20 To trigger judicial estoppel, two factors must be shown: “[f]irst, it
must be shown that the allegedly inconsistent positions were made under
oath in a prior proceeding. Second, such inconsistencies must be shown to
have been calculated to make a mockery of the judicial system.”21
B.

Facts of Parker v. Wendy’s International, Inc.

In January 1999, Parker filed a complaint against Wendy’s alleging
racial discrimination in the workplace and retaliation in violation of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §2000e, et seq.22 Wendy’s denied
the allegations contained in the complaint, and the case was then set for
trial.23 On February 9, 2001, Parker and her former husband filed a petition
for relief under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code in the United States
Bankruptcy Court for the North Division of Alabama.24 Parker’s schedule
of assets did not include the claim against Wendy’s as a potential asset.25
On May 31, 2001, the bankruptcy court entered an order granting a “no
asset” discharge26 for Parker and her former husband.27 When Parker
learned that the existence of the cause of action against Wendy’s should
have been disclosed to the bankruptcy trustee, she authorized her attorneys
representing her in the District Court case to contact the Trustee.28 The
Trustee, Reynolds, moved to have the bankruptcy case reopened so that he
could distribute the asset in the event of an award to Parker.29 Reynolds
also moved to intervene in the discrimination case or, alternatively, for
substitution as the real party in interest.30 The bankruptcy court granted
Reynolds’ motion to reopen, and the district court granted his motion to
intervene.31 Wendy’s then moved to dismiss Parker’s discrimination
claims, arguing that under the Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning in Burnes v.

20
J. Gottlieb & B. Greer, supra n. 17, at 494-95. Although some jurisdictions do not require that the
debtor intentionally fail to disclose the existence of a potential cause of action. See Chaveriat v.
Williams Pipe Line Co., 11 F.3d 1420 (7th Cir. 1993); Tenneco Chems. v. William T. Burnett & Co., 691
F.2d 658, 665 (4th Cir. 1982); Brassfield v. Jack McLendon Furniture, Inc., 953 F. Supp. 1424 (M.D.
Ala. 1996).
21
Burnes, 291 F.3d at 1285 (quoting Salomon Smith Barney, Inc. v. Harvey, M.D., 269 F.3d 1302, 1308
(11th Cir. 2001)).
22
Parker, 365 F.3d at 1269.
23
Id. at 1270.
24
Id.
25
Id.
26
The release of a debtor from monetary obligations upon adjudication of bankruptcy. Black's Law
Dictionary 495 (Bryan A. Garner ed., 8th ed., West 2004); 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(6).
27
Parker, 365 F.3d at 1269.
28
Appellant’s Br., Parker v. Wendy’s Intl. Inc., 365 F.3d 1268 (11th Cir. 2004).
29
Id.
30
Parker, 365 F.3d at 1270.
31
Id.
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Pemco Aeroplex, Inc.,32 Parker was barred by the doctrine of judicial
estoppel because the cause of action was not asserted in the bankruptcy
court.33 Wendy’s claimed that Parker would not have been entitled to a “no
asset” complete discharge of all her debts if the creditors, the bankruptcy
court, and her trustee had known of the lawsuit claiming substantial
damages.34
The district court granted Wendy’s motion to dismiss, which it
construed as a motion for judgment on the pleadings.35 The district court
found the case “factually and procedurally indistinguishable from Burnes
because Parker had failed to disclose the existence of her discrimination
claim when she filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy, . . . [resulting] in the
discharge of her debts.”36 As a result, the district court held that Parker was
judicially estopped from bringing her discrimination claim and dismissed
her claim with prejudice.37
Reynolds then moved for reconsideration, arguing that the Parker
case was distinguishable from Burnes.38 Reynolds argued that the real
party in interest in Burnes was the debtor acting on his own behalf, whereas
in this case it was the Trustee acting on behalf of Parker’s creditors.39
Reynolds further argued that Parker and her attorneys informed Reynolds of
the claim and he reopened the bankruptcy case before Wendy’s moved to
dismiss based on judicial estoppel.40 In Burnes, the debtor moved to reopen
the bankruptcy case only after the defendant filed a motion to dismiss based
on judicial estoppel.41 Finally, Reynolds argued that imposing judicial
estoppel would result in an injustice to the innocent creditors who would be
denied the possibility of recovering money owed to them by the debtor.42
Further, it would also grant a windfall to Wendy’s, who would escape its
liability at the expense of the creditors in the bankruptcy case.43
The district court was not persuaded by Reynolds’ intervention as
the real party in interest, nor that Reynolds reopened the case prior to

32
Burnes, 291 F.3d at 1282. In Burnes, a debtor in bankruptcy had a pending cause of action against
and employer and failed to schedule it. The debtor initially failed to disclose the potential asset on his
Chapter 13 petition, then again failed to disclose it when the Chapter 13 case was converted to Chapter
7. In focusing on the apparent intent of the debtor to hide the cause of action, the court held that the
debtor was judicially estopped from asserting the discrimination claim against his employer.
33
Parker, 365 F.3d at 1270.
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
Id.
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
Infra n. 53.
42
Parker, 365 F.3d at 1271.
43
Id.
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Wendy’s asserting judicial estoppel.44 The district court held that Parker,
who remained a party to the discrimination action, had asserted a claim that
was inconsistent with the position she took in the bankruptcy case.45 She
was, therefore, judicially estopped.46 Reynolds filed a timely appeal.47
C.

The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion

On appeal from the United States District Court, the Eleventh
Circuit reviewed the issue of judicial estoppel for an abuse of discretion.48
The court of appeals considered two factors under which judicial estoppel
would be invoked. “First it must be shown that the allegedly inconsistent
positions were made under oath in a prior proceeding. Second, such
inconsistencies must be shown to have been calculated to make a mockery
of the judicial system.”49 The court of appeals seemed persuaded by
Reynolds’ argument that the inconsistent statements of Parker should not be
attributed to him because he himself did not make inconsistent statements
before the court.50 The court of appeals also acknowledged that applying
judicial estoppel to the Trustee would not serve the policy of encouraging
disclosure and that it would also preclude money from getting to the
creditors.51
While acknowledging the arguments of the Trustee, the court did
not follow that rationale in formulating its holding. The court ruled that the
correct analysis compels “the conclusion that judicial estoppel should not
be applied at all.”52 The court of appeals then called into question whether
the Burnes53 case, which was the basis for the district court’s decision, was
a correct application of judicial estoppel.54 The court stated that the more
appropriate defense in Burnes was that the debtor lacked standing.55 Citing
Barger v. City of Cartersville, the court held that “[g]enerally . . . a prepetition cause of action is the property of the Chapter 7 bankruptcy estate,

44

Id.
Id.
46
Id.
47
Id.
48
Id. The court reviewed the judgment on the pleadings de novo, however the district court’s
application of judicial estoppel was reviewed for under an abuse of discretion standard.
49
Infra n. 53.
50
Parker, 365 F.3d at 1271.
51
Id.
52
Id. at 1272.
53
291 F.3d at 1282 (focusing on the intentional nondisclosure of a cause of action by a debtor). This
court held that the initial nondisclosure, along with a further nondisclosure when the debtor converted
his bankruptcy case from Chapter 13 to Chapter 7. This apparent intentional nondisclosure seemed to
compel the court to apply judicial estoppel. Burnes can also be distinguished from Parker due to the
fact that the trustee never attempted to intervene in Burnes, therefore judicial estoppel was applied
solely to the nondisclosing debtor.
54
Parker, 365 F.3d at 1272.
55
Id.
45
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and only the trustee in bankruptcy has standing to pursue it.”56 The
Bankruptcy Code provides that both tangible and intangible assets vest in
the bankruptcy estate as of the commencement of the case.57 Considering
that such property includes causes of action belonging to the debtor, the
trustee, as representative of the bankruptcy estate, is the proper party in
interest and the only party with standing to prosecute causes of action
belonging to the estate.58 The court explained that once an asset becomes
part of the bankruptcy estate, all rights held by the debtor in an asset are
extinguished59 unless the asset is abandoned back60 to the debtor by the
trustee.61 Property of the estate that is not abandoned under § 554 and is
not administered to the creditors in the bankruptcy proceeding remains
property of the estate.62 Therefore, Parker’s discrimination claim became
an asset of the bankruptcy estate when she filed her petition.63 Because
Reynolds as the trustee became the real party in interest in Parker’s
discrimination claim, and he never took an inconsistent position before the
court, he cannot be judicially estopped from pursuing it.64
III.

ANALYSIS

The new direction that the Eleventh Circuit takes in the Parker case
is appropriate for three primary reasons. First, the decision is supported by
the text of the Bankruptcy Code. Second, the decision furthers the
equitable considerations that are the foundations of the Bankruptcy Code,
the doctrine of judicial estoppel, and our legal system as a whole. These
equitable considerations include the repayment of creditors in bankruptcy65
and the legal accountability66 of discriminating parties and other
tortfeasors.67 Third, while the Parker decision furthers these objectives and
sets a clear path for other courts deciding cases dealing with judicial
estoppel and nondisclosure in bankruptcy, the court could have included

56
Id. (citing Barger v. City of Cartersville, 348 F.3d 1289, 1292 (11th Cir. 2003)). See also Dunmore v.
U.S., 358 F.3d 1107, 1112 (9th Cir. 2004) (reasoning that trustee, not the debtor, is the real party in
interest and only the trustee has standing to pursue such claim).
57
11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (2000).
58
11 U.S.C. § 323 (2000); Barger, 348 F.3d at 1292.
59
Barger, 348 F.3d at 1292. The court used the term “extinguished.” The property rights of the debtor
are actually held in trust, where they may be administered to creditors and/or re-vested with the debtor
after the bankruptcy proceeding. See 11 U.S.C. 726.
60
11 U.S.C. § 554(a) (2000). The trustee may disclaim an asset of the debtor that is burdensome to the
estate or that is of inconsequential value to the estate.
61
See 11 U.S.C. § 554 (a)-(c).
62
Id. at § 554 (d).
63
Parker, 365 F.3d at 1272.
64
Id.
65
Infra n. 83.
66
See generally John Hasnas, Equal Opportunity, Affirmative Action, and the Anti-Discrimination
Principle: The Philosophical Basis for the Legal Prohibition of Discrimination, 71 Fordham L. Rev.
423 (2002).
67
“A constitutional tort committed under the color of state law (such as a civil-rights violation) is
actionable under 42 USCA § 1983.” Black's Law Dictionary at 1526.
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within its holding a “middle of the road” provision which would preserve
some of the objectives of judicial estoppel.
The “middle of the road” provision would involve allowing the
trustee to intervene and carry out a lawsuit on behalf of the plaintiff, but it
would only allow a damages award to the extent necessary to repay the
creditors. The nondisclosing debtor would only be precluded from
receiving the residual amount of the award that is over and above the debt if
he is found to have intentionally failed to disclose a cause of action. Thus,
the residual discrimination award that is left over after the repayment of
creditors will remain with the defendant in the discrimination suit. This
resolution would provide some degree of solace to a defendant seeking to
invoke judicial estoppel. It would also create a disincentive for a debtor in
bankruptcy from failing to schedule causes of action. In the contrary
situation where the lawsuit award amounts to less than what is required to
pay the creditors in bankruptcy, the court can hold the debtor judicially
estopped from receiving a discharge of the debts still remaining. This
condition could be applied at the discretion of the court. In their analysis of
judicial estoppel, many courts have held that the second of two elements
that must be met is that the debtor must have shown a bad faith intent to
hide the existence of a cause of action from the bankruptcy court, the
creditors, and the trustee.68
A.

The Court’s Holding is Supported by the Text of the Bankruptcy
Code

The court held that the correct analysis compels the conclusion that
the debtor did not have standing and that judicial estoppel should not be
applied at all.69 The court cited Barger for the proposition that a prepetition cause of action is the property of the Chapter 7 bankruptcy estate;
therefore, it is the trustee and not the individual debtor that has standing to
pursue it.70 The property of the bankruptcy estate includes “all legal and
equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the
case.”71 Pursuant to § 323, the trustee is the representative of the estate and
the trustee manages the assets of the estate.72 In Barger, the court found
that the property described in § 541 included causes of action belonging to

68

The Seventh Circuit and the Eight Circuit have expressly required intentional nondisclosure. See In re
Cassidy 892 F.2d at 641; Total Petroleum, Inc. v. Davis, 822 F.2d 734, 738 n. 6 (8th Cir. 1987). The
First Circuit and the Third Circuit have expressed that a finding of intentional nondisclosure is not
necessary. See Jeffrey v. Desmond, 70 F.3d 183 (1st Cir. 1995); Ryan Operations G.P. v. SantiamMidwesy Lumber Co., 81 F.3d 355, 365 (3rd Cir. 1996).
69
Parker, 365 F.3d at 1272 (calling into question the application of judicial estoppel in Burnes as well).
70
Id.
71
11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1). This requires that all of the debtor’s assets, both tangible and intangible, vest
in the bankruptcy estate at the moment the debtor files its bankruptcy petition.
72
11 U.S.C. § 323(a) (2000) “The trustee in a case under this title . . . is the representative of the estate.”
Id. See also 11 U.S.C. § 704.
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the debtor at the commencement of the case.73 The approach of the Barger
court was procedural, analyzing the estate’s interests in an undisclosed
cause of action within the context of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
17(a)74 and 25(c)75 as a simple transferee of an interest in a cause of
action.76 In Parker, Rule 17 may not have been applicable because the
action was filed by the proper party.77 “Thus, the trustee, as the
representative of the bankruptcy estate, is the proper party in interest, and is
the only party with standing to prosecute causes of action belonging to the
estate.”78 The trustee was the real party in interest; therefore, the trustee has
exclusive standing to assert any discrimination claims.79
In Parker, the trustee’s exclusive standing was caused by the filing of the
bankruptcy case. The difference in the analysis between Parker and Barger
is that the court in Parker did not use Rule 25(a) to bind the trustee who
intervened in the lawsuit to the effect of judicial estoppel.80 The holding in
Parker seemed to be an alternative application of the principles set forth in
Barger. Barger effectively held that the statutory protections afforded by
§§ 541, 323, and 362 of the Bankruptcy Code were subordinate to
procedural rules designed to govern the mechanics of civil proceedings in
the federal legal system.81 The analysis in Parker relied exclusively on the
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code in resolving the standing issue.82 Based
on these considerations, the court’s holding on the trustee’s exclusive

73

Barger, 348 F.3d at 1292.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(a). “Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest.” Id.
75
Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(c) (stating “[i]n case of any transfer of interest, the action may be continued by or
against the original party”). However, this rule is overridden by Section 362 of the Bankruptcy Code.
11 U.S.C. § 362 (2000). Section 362(a)(3) provides a stay against any action to control or possess
property of the estate. Id. In this situation, the continuation of the action by the debtor, without
intervention by the trustee or authorization of the court, is an exertion of control over the estate’s cause
of action. Louis M. Phillips & Brandon A. Brown, Continuing Ruminations on Judicial Estoppel:
Barging into the Consumer Field, 2004 No. 2 Norton Bank. L. Advisor 4, 5. (stating “[r]ule 25(a) is a
procedural rule and cannot override the substantive component of § 362”).
76
Phillips & Brown, supra n. 75, at 3.
77
Id. The article here called into question the use of Rule 17(a) in Barger because it is a rule that
mandates no action shall be dismissed on the ground that it is not prosecuted in the name of the real
party in interest until reasonable time has been allowed for joinder or substitution of the real party in
interest. See Hilbrands v. FarEast Trading Co., 509 F.2d 1321, 1323 (9th Cir. 1975) (reasoning “[r]ule
17(a) would control if an interest was transferred prior to commencement of the suit”).
78
Parker, 365 F.3d at 1272; 11 U.S.C. § 323(b) (2000) (reading “[t]he trustee in a case under this title
has capacity to sue and be sued”).
79
Barger, 348 F.3d at 1291 (stating that the plaintiff/debtor filed her bankruptcy petition after she filed
her discrimination claims, thus the discrimination claims were property of the bankruptcy estate and the
trustee has exclusive standing to asset such claims). See Wienberg v. GTE Southwest Incorporated, 272
F.3d 302, 306 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding that when the trustee is the real party in interest, only that trustee
has standing to assert a claim belonging to the bankruptcy estate); Frank v. Utica Mutual Insurance Co.,
109 B.R. 668 (E.D. Penn. 1990) (holding that where a debtor fails to list a cause of action as an asset,
the trustee cannot abandon that claim and thus the debtor is precluded from enforcing the claim after
discharge); In re Alvarez, 224 F.3d 1273 (11th Cir. 2000) (debtor may not assert claims belonging to the
bankruptcy estate without participation of the trustee).
80
Parker, 365 F.3d at 1272.
81
Phillips & Brown, supra n. 75, at 8.
82
Parker, 365 F.3d at 1272 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1)).
74
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standing is supported by the Bankruptcy Code and the prior precedent.
B.

The Court’s Decision Upholds the Equitable Considerations that
are at the Foundation of the Bankruptcy Code and our Legal
System

The Bankruptcy Code and our traditional jurisprudence contain
equitable considerations that pertain to the treatment of various parties
under the law and also to the application of existing law as it applies to
those various parties.83 Bankruptcy law has been a crucial component to
both our legal system and our economy.84 It is bankruptcy law that
determines the financial fate of both debtors and creditors. It applies not
only after a debtor has defaulted on a debt owed, but also dictates what the
character of the financial relationship will be prior to engaging in lending
and borrowing.
Given the dramatic effect that bankruptcy law has on the lives of
individuals and businesses, it is of the utmost importance that the framers of
the Bankruptcy Code write the law in such a way as to observe principles of
equity, fairness, and accountability. “Bankruptcy law has two primary
goals: It seeks the orderly and equitable repayment of claims for the benefit
of the creditors, and it offers an economic fresh start to the proverbial
‘honest but unfortunate debtor.’”85 Debtor relief as a primary objective of
bankruptcy law in particular is a peculiarity of American law.86 Professor
Charles Hallinan notes that the developing recognition of the legitimacy of
debtor protection and relief in the nineteenth century can be attributed to the
corresponding importance of credit in the nation’s economic structure.87
One of the two reasons that Professor Hallinan states for the development
of debtor relief laws is that the moral ideals manifested in forgiving the
debtor’s misfortune are favorable to any harsh punishment that might be
inflicted for the debtor’s wrongdoing.88 This important consideration of
debtor relief, or the “fresh start” policy,89 is balanced by the first of two
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Hon. Marcia S. Krieger, “The Bankruptcy Court is a Court of Equity”: What Does That Mean?, 50
S.C. L. Rev. 275, 276 (1999) (reasoning “[b]ankruptcy law is implemented by using both legal and
equitable procedures”).
84
See Lewis D. Soloman & Kathleen J. Collins, Humanistic Economics: A New Model for the
Corporate Social Responsibility Debate, 12 J. Corp. L. 331, 352 (1987) (explaining a new model of
humanistic economics which was designed to improve corporate social responsibility).
85
Whaley & Morris, Problems and Materials on Debtor and Creditor Law, 2 (2d. ed., Aspen L. & Bus.
2001); See Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234 (1934). This is one of the most cited bankruptcy
decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court.
86
Charles G. Hallinan, The ‘Fresh Start’ Policy in Consumer Bankruptcy: A Historical Inventory and an
Interpretive Theory, 21 U. Rich. L. Rev. 49, 53 n. 12 (1986) (stating that of the various legal systems in
which bankruptcy is an available remedial device for adjusting the debtor-creditor relationship, only
United States bankruptcy appears to afford a freely available discharge to debtors without regard to the
level of payments or consent of the creditors).
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Id. at 56.
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Id. at 57.
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Local Loan Co., 292 U.S. at 244.
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goals of bankruptcy law, the orderly and equitable repayment of creditors.
The goals of bankruptcy are heavily influenced by our traditional
system of jurisprudence. Our legal system has developed over two hundred
years under the premise that justice is sought and wrongdoers are to be
accountable, not only for the betterment of their victims, but also in the
sense that wrongdoers deserve punishment and must be deterred from
further wrongful acts.90 The objectives of bankruptcy law are not unique to
American law. In fact, the concepts of debtor relief within bankruptcy can
be found in both the Old Testament91 and Roman Law.92 As it concerns
American law, the founding fathers recognized the sociopolitical and
commercial importance of bankruptcy.93 The court in Parker properly
observed these aforementioned considerations by reaching a result that
allowed for the bankruptcy estate to have more money for the repayment of
worthy creditors. The Parker decision upholds these principles by
punishing the discriminating party for its unlawful discrimination and not
punishing the creditors in bankruptcy for the wrongful acts of the debtor.
Thus, the Eleventh Circuit acted appropriately in reaching a result that
properly observes the fundamental precepts of bankruptcy.
1.

The Repayment of Creditors

As noted above, the repayment of creditors is one of the primary
goals of the bankruptcy courts and should be observed by other courts
dealing with debtors and creditors in bankruptcy. Courts have recently
given more recognition to this objective. One such opinion states that,
“court[s] cannot countenance depriving Debtor’s creditors of the
opportunity to share in damages to which [debtors are] entitled in order to
preserve [the defendant’s] judicial estoppel argument.”94
In Rochester, the court analyzed the importance of the repayment
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See W. Nelson, Americanization of the Common Law (1975) for a general analysis of the historical
development of the common law, and in particular, pages 41- 43, for an analysis of the common law and
natural law roots of American bankruptcy law.
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exact it again; but that which is tine with they brother thine hand shall release; save when there shall be
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David S. Kennedy & R. Spencer Clift, III, An Historical Analysis of Insolvency Laws and Their
Impact on the Role, Power, and Jurisdiction of Today’s United States Bankruptcy Court and Its Judicial
Officers, 9 J. Bankr. L. & Prac. 165, 167 (2000) (explaining that until Julius Caesar had enacted the law
known as Cessio Bonorum, Roman Law gave creditors the right to carve up the body of the insolvent
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Id. at 170 (noting that Congress’ power to establish uniform bankruptcy laws was inserted in the
Constitution immediately after the power to regulate commerce in Article I, Section 8, Clause 4).
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In the Matter of Rochester, 308 B.R. 596, 605-606 (N.D. Georgia 2004) (balancing the importance of
the repayment of creditors against the preservation of the defendant’s judicial estoppel argument in the
context of whether or not to reopen the bankruptcy case). In Parker, the bankruptcy case was in fact
reopened upon the motion of the trustee. Parker, 365 F.3d at 1268.
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of creditors. That court noted that “[a] debtor’s attempt to keep assets from
creditors should not preclude those same creditors from sharing in the
proceeds of the concealed asset.”95 There have been three cases in which
the Eleventh Circuit has affirmed orders in which a district court has
granted summary judgment to a defendant on the basis that the plaintiff’s
failure to disclose a cause of action during a bankruptcy case judicially
estopped that plaintiff from pursuing the claim.96 These cases suggest that
the debtor may be judicially estopped if the court has found that the debtor
intentionally failed to disclose or purposefully tries to hide the assets from
the bankruptcy estate.97 While there was no finding of intentional
nondisclosure in Parker, the policy considerations behind changing the
effect of intentional nondisclosure are substantial. In the prior section, the
analysis behind the standing argument suggests that the application of
judicial estoppel based on the intent of the nondisclosing debtor would
either be irrelevant or disjointed and inconsistent with the law. The bad
faith that a nondisclosing debtor displays should be used to punish the
debtor, not the innocent creditors. This important objective can be achieved
and will be addressed in section C of this article.
The Parker court’s resistance to apply judicial estoppel is
understandable. This modest approach works to benefit the innocent
creditors and allows for a clearer doctrine that does not involve the court
trying to quasi-subjectively determine the debtor’s intent. The carelessness
of a hapless debtor who fails to schedule a potential lawsuit with the
bankruptcy estate should not work against innocent creditors who already
have had their rights usurped by the filing of bankruptcy.98 As this article
will further discuss, the objective of the doctrine of judicial estoppel, which
punishes inconsistencies in one’s positions being shown “to make a
mockery of the judicial system,”99 can be achieved in another way, not at
the expense of the innocent creditors.
2.

A Discriminating Party Should Not Be Absolved of Wrongdoing
Based on a Mistake of a Debtor in Bankruptcy

When the district court held the plaintiff judicially estopped, it
jettisoned Wendy’s liability on a basis that had nothing to do with the
merits of the employment discrimination case. The district court not only
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In the Matter of Rochester, 308 B.R. at 602.
See Barger, 348 F.3d 1289; DeLeon v. Comcar Industries, Inc., 321 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2003);
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dismissed the case, but dismissed it with prejudice, meaning that Parker
could not bring the lawsuit in the future. This dismissal effectively creates
a windfall for Wendy’s and does nothing to discourage the potentially
illegal behavior of a major employer. The position taken by the court of
appeals in Parker allows for the merits of the discrimination suit to be tried
and for the liable party to be punished for its indiscretions.
The tradition behind American jurisprudence compels the judicial
system to punish wrongdoers and to hold those who commit wrongs to be
accountable not only for the sake of justice, but also for the deterrent effect
that discrimination litigation can have on businesses. In recent years, the
doctrine of judicial estoppel has been raised as a defense to various claims
with increasing frequency.100 The application of judicial estoppel in
conventional fashion leaves victims uncompensated, while wrongdoers
avoid legal scrutiny for their actions. If the court of appeals had affirmed
the district court’s implementation of judicial estoppel, innocent creditors
would have gone unpaid for something over which they had no control and
also a potentially liable employment discriminator would have gone
unpunished. These two outcomes would have been in the name of
“[protecting] the judiciary, as an institution, from the perversion of judicial
machinery.”101 While preserving integrity of the judiciary is an important
motive, it should not come at the expense of innocent creditors, and
consequence-free discrimination, when there is a better way to apply the
principles of judicial estoppel that preserve the integrity of the judicial
system.
C.

The Proper Extension of the Doctrine of Judicial Estoppel Based
on Parker

Critics of the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Parker might argue that
the whole purpose behind judicial estoppel is moot if the courts allow the
trustee in bankruptcy to intervene in the plaintiff/debtors cause of action
that they did not disclose. These critics will claim that the purpose of
judicial estoppel that discourages debtors from hiding assets from the
bankruptcy estate will be phased out and made irrelevant by allowing
trustees to intervene on behalf of the plaintiff/debtor. The argument would
purport that Parker encourages a debtor to hide pending or potential causes
of action knowing that if they are discovered, the trustee can simply
intervene and carry out the suit on the debtor’s behalf. Thus, the deterrent
effect of judicial estoppel is negated. This could be true based on the
doctrine that seems to have been laid down by Parker. However, a change
in the application of the doctrine, together with the court’s holding on
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standing, would quash the counterarguments to the doctrine laid down in
Parker. This change involves a relatively small doctrinal change in the
application of judicial estoppel and an extension of the principles of Parker.
1.

Allow the Bankruptcy Estate to Have the Monetary Award from a
Discrimination Suit and Judicially Estop the Intentional Nondisclosing Debtor from Collecting the Residual Amount

As was explained earlier, and held in Parker, the trustee must be
permitted to intervene as the real party in interest because it is afforded
standing by the Bankruptcy Code.102 The doctrine of judicial estoppel,
however, can still be applied to the plaintiff. Many courts have held that
bad faith or intentional nondisclosure of a cause of action when scheduling
the assets in bankruptcy is a necessary element for application of judicial
estoppel.103 The difficulty may arise in how a court might determine
whether a nondisclosing debtor was intentionally hiding assets. The Fifth
Circuit has adopted a test which has been also adopted by the Sixth
Circuit104 to determine whether an omission was inadvertent.105 Under the
Fifth Circuit test, as outlined in In re Coastal Plains, Inc., there are two
circumstances under which a debtor’s failure to disclose a cause of action in
a bankruptcy proceeding might be deemed inadvertent.106 The first is where
the debtor lacks knowledge of the factual basis of the undisclosed claims.107
The second is where the debtor has no motive for concealment.108 The
Eleventh Circuit has employed this standard as well.109
The proper application of judicial estoppel should take place in the
context of what amount of money, if any, should go to the plaintiff/nondisclosing debtor after the bankruptcy estate has paid off all of the
creditors.110 The same factors and analysis used in deciding whether a
plaintiff is judicially estopped can still be applied, but only to determine
whether the plaintiff/debtor can retain the residual award that remains after
the creditors have been fully paid. For example, if a debtor has $100,000 of
debt, and the likely award from a discrimination suit is $150,000, then
assuming that the discrimination award is used to pay the entire debt, there
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is $50,000 left over for the debtor. Under this alternative application of
judicial estoppel, the positive objectives of the creditor repayment and the
accountability of the discriminating party are realized. The judicial
estoppel analysis should still be applied to the debtor, including the
provisions that exist in some jurisdictions that require intentional
nondisclosure on the part of the plaintiff. If the debtor is found to have
intentionally hid the existence of a cause of action from the bankruptcy
estate, then that plaintiff should be judicially estopped from receiving the
award money that is left over after the creditors are paid.
This policy would serve the goal of discouraging nondisclosure and
punishing those who attempt to hide assets from the bankruptcy estate.
This policy also places the punishment on the wrongdoing party instead of
holding innocent creditors accountable for the chicanery of the debtor. This
method is consistent with the concept that only the trustee has standing
because it is the real party in interest.111 If one was to analyze the interest
that the debtor and the trustee have in the award money, one could conceive
that the trustee’s interest in the award would only exist to the extent that the
award could go to pay the creditors. Thus, the interest of the debtor may
then extend to the amount that exists after the creditors have been paid. It
would make sense to judicially estop the intentional, nondisclosing debtor
to the extent that he has an interest in the award, which would only be the
amount, if any, that is over and above what is needed to pay the creditors.
Under this application, the objectives that judicial estoppel seeks to attain
would be preserved, while further considerations of creditor repayment and
accountability of discriminating parties would be addressed appropriately as
well.
2.

If the Monetary Award is Less Than the Amount Owed to Creditors
in Bankruptcy, the Court Should Judicially Estop the Intentional,
Non-disclosing Debtor from Getting a Discharge of the Residual
Debt

The equitable considerations addressed in Subsection (1) can be
applied in the same sense when the award from a lawsuit is not sufficient to
cover the debt owed to the creditors in bankruptcy. The standard that must
be met for judicial estoppel to be triggered is basically the same as the
standard explained in Subsection (1). If a debtor is found to have
intentionally hidden a pending cause of action from the bankruptcy estate,
the trustee should still be permitted to intervene on behalf of the plaintiff.
However, judicial estoppel will still be applied to punish the debtor and
benefit the creditors. If the amount of the award does not cover the debts
owed to the creditors in bankruptcy, the remaining debt will not be
discharged if the debtor has been found to have intentionally hid that cause
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of action from the bankruptcy estate. For example, if a debtor has $100,000
of debt, and the likely award from a discrimination suit is only $60,000,
then assume that the penniless debtor must use that entire award to pay his
creditors. If this debtor has been found to have intentionally hid the
existence of this discrimination suit from the bankruptcy estate, that debtor
should be judicially estopped from having the remaining $40,000 of his
debt discharged.
This application of judicial estoppel would further the same
equitable principles discussed in the previous sections. Under this
application, a bad faith, non-disclosing debtor would be punished for
double-dealing with the bankruptcy court. Also, the discriminating party
would not be granted a windfall by having its liability extinguished through
no positive action of its own. Likewise, this application allows for the
creditors to be paid off in full, or at least to a greater extent than they would
have been paid had judicial estoppel precluded the lawsuit from being
carried out. The court’s authority to implement this application is also
supported by § 105(a) of the Bankruptcy Code.112
IV.

CONCLUSION

The decision of the Eleventh Circuit in Parker is an appropriate one
because it clarifies the doctrine of judicial estoppel, and it also is consistent
with the text of the Bankruptcy Code. The decision also furthers the
equitable considerations of repayment of creditors and accountability of
tortfeasors. The Parker decision represents a change in the application of
judicial estoppel. For the abovementioned reasons, this change is
appropriate; but what it fails to do is remedy an evil of which judicial
estoppel is supposed to quash. Part C of Section III of this article proposes
a policy that allows for nondisclosing debtors in bad faith to be judicially
estopped from receiving a monetary award from a discrimination suit or
from having debts discharged that cannot be paid from the proceeds of a
third party lawsuit. Under the holding in Parker, along with the alternative
application advocated in this article, the doctrine of judicial estoppel can be
used to preserve the integrity of the judicial system, as well as advance
equitable principles inherent in the Bankruptcy Code and traditional
American jurisprudence.
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